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[Abstract] In this paper, I analyze how corruption in one country may be affected 
by its neighbors’ corruption. It seeks to explain why corruption is perpetuating in 
large geographical areas populated by developing countries despite anticorruption 
efforts made in the single country. 
      In our empirical approach, we capture the spatial dependency by regional corrup-
tion. Three main techniques are used: spatial autocorrelation tests, GMM and three 
stage least squares. Our results show that, a lower regional corruption (as measured 
by the average of the level of corruption in one country’s neighbors) is associated 
with a lower level of national corruption. Among the potential mechanisms explain-
ing this correlation, the level of economic development (GDP per capita) seems to 
be the most important. Foreign aid and trade openness show less clear results. Non-
economic mechanisms such as cross-country contagion processes of  voice expres-
sions and demands on accountability are other possible transmission mechanisms. 
Keywords: Corruption, economic development, trade, persistence, political factors, 
social factors.
JEL classiﬁcation: H1, O10, O2, Z13

Introduction 
Evidence is growing that corruption1 slows economic growth for the single country (Ades and 
di Tella, 1996; Mauro, 1995, 1997; Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1991; Rose-Ackerman, 
1996, Rose-Ackerman and Coolidge, 1997; World Bank, 1997, Dreher and Herzfeld, 2005; 
Gerlagh and Pelligrini, 2004; Minorov, 2005). It is important therefore to understand the 
causes of corruption in order to eradicate it efficiently.  
This paper aims to study the contagion effects of corruption, captured through spatial 
interactions between countries. To my knowledge this is a set of mechanisms that so far has 
not received much attention in empirical research of corruption2. I inquire whether spatial 
interdependency contributes to understand the persistence of corruption. Here, I assume that 
the persistence of corruption is developing countries can be explained by the contagion phe-
nomenon. If such an effect exists it should to be based on interactions between individuals 
(Manski, 2000) of two different countries.  
 The contagion effect may mainly take place at the bribe payers’ end, since the migra-
tion at the main bribe receivers’ end, among the public employees, naturally is quite limited3. 
Here spillover mechanisms have to be more indirect: being educated at the same regional uni-
versity centers, the same American, French or British university, or participation to the same 
conferences; for example customs officers from the same region may participate to an anticor-
ruption conference. Fisman and Miguel (2006, 2007) consider that diplomats’ behaviors in 
violating parking could be “interpreted as an indication of their home country’s cultural toler-
ance for corruption rather than their own personal values”. Bribe payers such as businessmen 
may physically move into a neighbor country and pay bribes there.  
Besides this increase in neighborhood opportunities, common language and culture 
shared by different people are sources of commercial relations (Moreno and Trehan, 1997). 
Another possible link is colonization history. But, it is also possible that people from nearby 
countries may have different social traditions, norms and trust vis-à-vis malfeasance, crime or 
                                                 
1 A prominent question in the literature has been how to define corruption. It is obvious that there is no unique 
definition of corruption. Different propositions, ranging from “too restrictive” to “too wide” (Amundsen, and al, 
2000) share a common denominator which can be expressed as follows: “the abuse of public authority or posi-
tion for private gains”. 
2 Our study is related to the empirical analysis of growth where Ades and Chua (1997) and others authors have 
documented a relationship between regional political instability and growth2. Moreno and Trehan (1997) docu-
mented neighborhood growth rate effects. Unlike these authors, I examine if regional dependency will have an 
impact on the level of corruption in a given country. Seldadyo (2008) has examined the space and governance 
nexus and concludes that spatial interactions matter. In this paper I will concentrate on corruption issues.  
3 An outline of theoretical possibilities here can be found in Andvig (2006). 
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corruption. Proximity induces countries to know about each other or to be influenced not only 
by economic or political arrangements but also institutional contexts in a given country. Indi-
viduals then decide accordingly to corrupt or to be corrupted by individuals from a nearby 
country, keeping in mind their own culture or that of the closest countries. And because 
agents of cross-border corruption are capable of doing business under certain constraints eve-
rywhere in the world, it is almost impossible to hold them accountable anywhere (Johnston, 
1997). 
The present study is related to the empirical literature of determinants of corruption. 
Existing econometric studies have looked at cross-section econometrics where country obser-
vations have been considered statistically independent (Treisman, 2000; Straub, 2000; Fre-
chette, 2001; Seldadyo and de Haan, 2005; Serra, 2006). However, cross-section economet-
rics (such as ordinary least squares) of corruption which are based on the assumption of sto-
chastic independence across countries are not efficient (Anselin, 2003). Thus, in order to take 
into account the spatial effects, two methodologies (which I describe in details below) are 
applied, assuming that countries’ observations are not independent: the spatial correlations 
tests and the Generalized Method of Moments with clusters. The former make it possible to 
detect the space dependence of a given variable, which is corruption in this study. The latter 
deals with the problem of endogeneity provided that many variables are plausibly endoge-
nous. A lot of right-side variables in the corruption equation are determined at the same time 
as corruption and interact with it (Treisman, 2000; Lambsdorff, 1999a). Indeed, they should 
all be considered endogenous. This is the case for the variables of economic development 
measured by per capita income (Mauro, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Treisman, 1998), trade 
policy (Ades and Di Tella (1995; 1996; 1997); Wei, 2003; Neeman et al., 2003; Laffont and 
N'Guessan, 1999), decentralization (Fishman and Gatti, 1999; de Mello and Barenstein, 
2001). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I presents some prelimi-
nary tests and selected variables. In section II and III the econometric approach and results are 
discussed. The robustness of the results is tested in section IV. Conclusions and policy impli-
cations are finally presented. 
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Section I – Empirical analysis of corruption: first diagnosis  
Empirical analyses are carried out on data covering four biannual periods (1996, 1998, 2000 
and 2002) (so as to match the temporal coverage of corruption variables) and 120 developing 
and developed countries (see appendix A1 for the list of these countries). The preliminary 
tests rely on the estimates of spatial correlations tests. Before its presentations, we describe 
the variable of corruption – that is, the national corruption of a single country.  
 
1.1- Corruption measurement issues4 
Corruption is difficult to measure because its activities are developed secretly. At macroeco-
nomic level, only perception indexes are available5. The corruption data we use in this study 
come from the governance database of Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (KKM, 2003). This 
database includes five other indicators6 of governance apart from that of corruption Our esti-
mates are based on data from 1996, 1998, 2000 and 20027. For the purpose of the analysis, we 
rescaled this variable from 0 (lowest corruption) to 10 (highest corruption)8. These data have 
some good characteristics which justify our preference for them and because they fill some 
gaps of the existing indicators found elsewhere in the literature. First, unlike the corruption 
variable of International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) indicator the index of KKM is a com-
posite one and is thus more precise and informative than any individual indicator. Second, it is 
a product of an unobserved component model which allows efficient computation of data 
coming from different individual sources. That is, it ensures comparability and clustering of 
individual measures. Third, the data from KKM (2003) include continuous variables, getting 
us rid of multinomial models regressions9.  
“Control of Corruption” measures perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined as 
“the exercise of public power for private gains”. Despite this straightforward focus, the par-
                                                 
4 Data sources for all other variables employed in the analysis are detailed in appendix A2. Summary statistics 
are provided in appendix A3. 
5 For discussions on use (abuse) and critics of governance and corruption indicators see Williams and Siddique 
(2007); Seligson, 2006; Kurt and Schrank, 2007; Arndt and Oman, 2006; Kaufmann et al, 2007). 
6 There are (i) Voice and Accountability; (ii) Government effectiveness, (iii) Regulatory Quality (iv) “Rule of 
Law” (v) “Political Stability and Absence of Violence”.  
7 This database is available for more recent years, the latest year being 2007. As part of our future research 
agenda, the analyses undertaken here could be extended.  
8 We rescale the indicator on a 0-10 basis according to the following formula: min
max min
10* x xx
x x
⎛ ⎞−= ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
.  
9 The corruption variable of Transparency International (TI) is also a composite one but not continous. Another 
limit of this variable is the aggregation methodology, which change each year, making it difficult year to year 
comparison. Finally, the sample coverage of TI’s variable is lower that the KKM’s.  
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ticular aspect of corruption measured by the various sources differs somewhat, ranging from 
the frequency of “additional payments to get things done,” to the effects of corruption on the 
business environment, to measuring “grand corruption” in the political arena or in the ten-
dency of elites to engage in “state capture”. The presence of corruption is often a manifesta-
tion of the lack of respect of both the corrupter (typically a private citizen or firm) and the 
corrupted (typically a public official or politician) for the rules which govern their interac-
tions, and hence represents a failure of governance (KKM, 2003). 
Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of corruption data for selected groups of 
countries covering the study’s periods10.  
Table 1: Corruption perception in major groups of countries 
 1996 1998 2000 2002 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Latin America 
OECD countries 
Other Developing Countries 
6.10 
5.41 
1.90 
5.35 
6.15  
5.38  
1.94  
5.33 
6.08  
5.22  
1.23  
5.34  
6.19  
5.16  
1.43  
5.22  
Overall mean  5.00 5.00  5.00 5.00  
 
NB: Data are ranged on 0–10 scale; where 0 means the lowest corruption level and 10 the 
highest corruption level.  
 
On average, all developing countries seem to be more significantly affected by corruption 
than OECD countries. Thus, these figures confirm the idea according to which developing 
countries have higher levels of corruption than developed countries. Nevertheless, it proved 
difficult to establish significant corruption differences between sub-Saharan Africa, Latin 
America and Asia. Another characteristic of this variable is the high correlation (a correlation 
coefficient of at least 0.94) between values of different periods.  
 
1.2- Measure of regional corruption 
The spatial autocorrelation is based on the concept of contiguity: two units are assumed to be 
contiguous if they share a common border. I first compute the regional corruption based on 
the neighborhood matrix11 and then present the tests and results.  
                                                 
10 Figures indicate the unweighted average level of corruption. In brackets, we have the number of countries. 
11 Knowing that we have a sample of 120 countries, the neighborhood matrix is 120X120. 
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To measure the contagion effect, we proceed as follow. For a country i, we calculate 
the simple average of corruption index values of its neighbors as defined by Ades and Chua 
(1997). To calculate regional corruption values for Togo for example, I sum corruption values 
of its neighbors (Benin, Ghana and Burkina Faso) and this sum is then divided by three, the 
number of Togo’s neighbors.  
The index values range as previously rescaled between 0 and 10 with bigger values as-
sociated with more corruption.  
In table 2, we present figures of the unweighted regional corruption.  
Table 2: The unweighted regional corruption statistics 
 1996 1998 2000 2002 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Latin America 
OECD Countries 
Other Developing Countries 
7.88 
7.37  
2.69  
5.63 
7.12  
6.64  
2.27  
5.02 
7.92  
7.40  
2.53 
5.58 
8.21  
7.67  
2.80 
5.86 
Overall mean  6.34 5.68 6.33 6.60 
 
As one could expect, African countries have on average the highest corruption concentration 
at the regional level. This is the case for all periods and confirms at a first glance high level of 
corruption in Africa.  
Nonetheless this preliminary result which is specially based on descriptive statistics 
needs to be strengthened through some rigorous empirical analyses. In the next subsections, I 
use two techniques to quantify the contagion effect of corruption: the tests of spatial autocor-
relation and the Generalized Moments Method (GMM).  
 
1.3-Tests of spatial autocorrelation 
The global autocorrelation and the Moran Diagram make it possible to detect the space de-
pendence of a given variable, which is corruption in this study. 
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The global correlation highlights the global spatial dependence at the level of single 
countries. This correlation is based, for a given variable, on the index of Moran which is cal-
culated as follows:  
 
0
( )( ) ( )ij i j i
i j i
w x x x x x x
I
S N
− − −
=
∑∑ ∑
   
with: 0
1 et ij i
i j i
S w x
N
= = x∑∑ ∑   
where represents the weighting coefficient and is defined for two countries i a by: ijw nd j  
1 if country  is neighbour of  country 
0 elsewhereij
i j
w =
ìïïíïïî
  
 
Table 3 presents the coefficients of global autocorrelation calculated on a sample of 122 coun-
tries (developed and developing) over the period 1996–2002. Calculations are based on cor-
ruption data, as described in the previous paragraphs.  
 Table 3: Index of spatial global correlation 
 
 Index of Moran 
(I) 
 Centered value of cor-
ruption variable 
 
P-value Ho 
 1996  0.416  6.425  0.000 
 1998   0.465  7.180  0.000 
 2000   0.442  6.827  0.000 
 2002   0.452  6.970  0.000 
Ho: Global Independence between countries.  
Estimations based on corruption data of KKM(2003) 
 
All the coefficients in Table 3 are positive and significant at 1% confidence level. Hence, 
neighborhood contries tend on average to share similar behaviors vis-à-vis corruption. 
The correlation between national corruption and corruption in neighboring countries 
can also be detected through the diagrams of Moran (Anselin, 2003). On these diagrams (Fig-
ure 2), national corruption is represented in X-axis and the regional corruption in Y-axis. The 
scatter plots are represented by the coordinates of each country of the sample. The diagram of 
Moran presents two advantages: (i) the adjustment line (average relationship) makes it possi-
ble to consider spatial correlation between national corruption and regional corruption and (ii) 
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the scatter plots contribute to appreciate the geographical distribution of the spatial correlation 
of corruption. There is a positive autocorrelation when there is a clustering of countries hav-
ing similar levels of corruption (quadrants I and III). When there is a grouping of countries 
with dissimilar levels of corruption, one speaks about negative autocorrelation (quadrants II 
and IV). 
The diagrams of Moran show a positive relation between national corruption and re-
gional corruption. Moreover, these diagrams support the assumption of a bipolar distribution 
of the levels of corruption: a clustering of the majority of developed countries (Sweden, 
Finland, Denmark, France, Norway, Switzerland, etc) whose levels of corruption are low 
(quadrant I) and a grouping of the developing countries with high levels of corruption (quad-
rant III). 
Figure 2 : Diagrams of Moran 
Moran scatterplot (Moran's I = 0.572)
corrup00
W
z
z
-2 -1 0 1 2 3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
ZAR
HTI
LBR
AGO
MMR
IRQ
SOMGAB
TKM
NGATJK
C R
EN
AZEKAZTZASDN
COG
UZB
YUG
UKRPRY
VENMKD
MWI
ZMB
NIC
KHMHNDCIV
LBY
IRN
ECU
KGZ
GEO
SLE
GTM
LA
DZA
PAK
RUS
SYR
ALB
ARMVNM
BLR
COL
PRK
LBN
BGR
UGA
OZ
PAN
BOL
TGO
GHA
NPL
GIN
C N
BGD
GNB
SENGUY
ROMMLI
DOM
TUR
THAINDER
BFA
MEX
MDA
SLV
ARG
ZWE
PER
HRV
LVAEGY
BRA
JOR
ARE
MYS
SUR
SVK
LTU
BRN
GMB
MNG
SAU
TUNMAR
CZE
POL
ITA
KORGRC
HUN
KWT
QAT
URY
EST
CRI
OMN
SVN
CHL
PRT
ISR
HKG
ESP
FRA
USA
DEU
AUT
SWE
DNKCAN
SGP
NOR
NLD
FIN
Moran scatterplot (Moran's I = 0.603)
corrup96
W
z
z
-2 -1 0 1 2 3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
ZARSOM
TJK
TKM
IRQ
PRY
PRK
NER
CMRSDN
MMR
RUS
AGO
MOZ
NGA
ECU
LBR
KENZMB
TZAZWE
UGA
ALB
ZB
MWI
LAO
AZE
KHM
KGZ
HTI
LBYGIN
SLE
OL
YUG
KAZ
HND
ARM
COG
VENPAK
GAB
DZA
UKR
TGO
GTM
GEO
BGDVNM
IRN
PLSYR
NBSLV
DA
GMB
ROM
COL
MEX
SEN
HRV
GHA
TUR
ARG
CIV
DOM
MKDEGY
MLIMNG
GUY
I D
PAN
CHN
PER
LBN
BGR
NIC
THA
LTU
LVA
MAR
JOR
BLRBRA
BFAEST
KOR
SUR
BRN
SVK
URY
POL
CZE
SAU
HUN
TUN
OMN
CRI
MYS
ARESVN
GRC
QAT
ITA
KWT
PRT
ISR HKG
FRA
CHL
USA
ESPDEU
AUT
NLD
NOR
CAN
FIN
DNK
SWE
SGP
Moran scatterplot (Moran's I = 0.557)
corrup98
W
z
z
-2 -1 0 1 2 3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
SOMZAR
MMR
IRQ
NGA
LBRTKM
TJK
SDN
AZE
AGO
BGD
YUG
KEN
UZB
GEO
CMR
ECU
TZA
LBY
COG
NER
GNB
HTI
PAK
UGA
GAB
GTM
UKR
LAOMDA
BLR
KAZZMB
GMB
SLE
VNM
SYRMKD
HNDARM
KGZ
RUS
TGO
BOL
VEN
CIVGINKHM
MLI
DOM
BFA
GUYPRY
NIC
MOZCOLGHA
IRN
PAN
THA
HRVLBN
MEX
SLV
DZA
SAU
NPL
PRK
SUREGY
MWI
ARG
ROM
BGR
INDSEN
MNG
ZWE
BRA
PER
SVK
TUN
M R
CHN
JORLVAALB
BRN
TUR
OMN
LTU
KOR
CZE
MYS
POL
URY
EST
ESP
HUN
GRC
QAT
KWT
ITA
CRI
SVN
ARE
ISR
FRA
CHL
AUTPRT
DEU
HKG
USA
SGP
NOR
NLDDNK
CAN
FIN
SWE
Moran scatterplot (Moran's I = 0.567)
corrup02
W
z
z
-2 -1 0 1 2 3
-1
0
1
2
3
SLE
LBR
SOM
IRQ
ZARKHM
MMR
LAOZWETKM
NGA
CMR
TJK
PRY
HTI
AZE
TZA
UKR
GEO
PRK
COGAGOKEN
TGO
LBY
RUS
MDA
NERKAZ
YUG
ALB
KGZ
BOL
UZB
BLR
ARG
MOZ
PAK
SDN
BFA
ARMGTMSLV
ECU
NIC
VNM
HND
DZA
VEN
IRN
BGR
UGA
GNB
MLI
ZMBB
LVA
MWI
MKDGHA
BGD
MNG
COL
DOM
MEX
SEN
ROM
LBN
CHN
SYR
GUY
PAN
NPL
IND
PEREGY
THA
BRN
GMB
QAT
TUR
BRA
SUR
LTU
SAU
TUN
JOR
MAR
HRV
SVK
GIN
GRC
CZE
CIV
MYS
EST
POL
KOR
ARE
HUN
CRI
URY
ITA
SVN
OMN
KWT
ISR
CHL
FRAPRT
HKG
ESP NOR
AUTUSA
CAN
DEU
NLD
FIN
SWE
SGP
DNK
 
I I 
II II 
C
o
 
 
r
r
u
p
t
i
o
n
r
é
g
i
o
n
a
l
e
R
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
 
c
o
r
r
u
p
t
i
o
n
 
IV IV 
III III 
National corruption 
National corruption 
I 
II 
II I 
R
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
 
c
o
r
r
u
p
t
i
o
n
 
IV 
III 
IV 
National corruption National corruption 
 12 
 Section II.- The Generalized Method of Moments estimations 
 
2.1- Motivations 
As I intend to analyze the contagion effect of corruption, by looking at the spatial interactions, my 
question is what the better econometric approach to use is. To deal with the weaknesses of the exist-
ing literature, I argue that the generalized moment method (GMM) is more appropriate.  
Using the GMM approach allows me to deal with the problem of endogeneity as many vari-
ables seem to be endogenous. This method is more efficient than the simple instrumental variables 
analysis (two stage least squares). As we have outlined above, almost all the variables under con-
sideration are affected by issues of simultaneity and endogeneity. Nevertheless, we focus on three 
of them: (i) the per capita GDP, (ii) trade openness and (iii) regional corruption that we consider all 
endogenous. As previously mentioned, some variables like fractionalization, colonial tradition and 
natural endowment could be considered as "mostly exogenous" (Treisman, 1998). The level of de-
velopment can affect corruption, and the reverse is also true, i.e. corruption reduces growth (Mauro, 
1995). On the other hand, trade reduces corruption, but it is also likely that corrupt bureaucrats cre-
ate opportunities for themselves to extract rents by generating barriers to trade (Treisman, 1998).  
The third variable has to my knowledge not been studied in any econometric research on 
corruption before. Interactions between regional corruption and national corruption might be en-
dogenous (cf. Manski, 2000). Yet, the challenge here is to find some good and valid instruments for 
regional spillovers. Referring to the empirical studies, we chose population, log of infant mortality, 
life expectancy and land area and distance from the equator as instruments. A good instrument is 
the one that is highly correlated to the instrumented variable and slightly if not at all to the unob-
served components (errors) of the explained variable. If we consider the instrument candidates, their 
relationship to GDP is well established in theory. As far as trade is concerned, Di Tella et al. (1999) 
used population and land area as instruments. Even though no theoretical explanation may support 
our instruments choice, we rely upon exogeneity tests. More specifically, Hansen tests are provided 
so as to test if the chosen instruments are exogenous.  
In addition, this method makes it possible to take into account the correlation between coun-
tries. Unlike much of previous empirical analysis, my study goes one step further and will help to 
get more insights on determinants of corruption.  
 
As data are only available on four periods, one may question the most appropriate method to 
employ. Among the studies that have discussed the time dimension, Treisman (1998) estimated 
 13
 separately two equations for the years 1980 and 1990 respectively. So did Ades and Di Tella 
(1999). In this study, we pool the data for the four periods. 
Furthermore, the fixed effects approach presents some limits for analyzing corruption. The 
main reason why fixed effect models are not appropriate is due to the low variability of corruption 
level over time. Indeed, only a smaller proportion of the variance of the corruption variable is ex-
plained. As a consequence, the standard errors tend to be larger and the coefficients estimates are 
biased toward zero (Woodridge, 2002). On the other hand, using the standard fixed effects method 
prevents from estimating the importance of the time-invariant variables which, according to Treis-
man (1998), seems important in the explanation of corruption12. Even though this approach could 
account for the bias due to the omission of these variables, it is not possible to get further empirical 
insights on how they contribute to explain the contagion effect which is my concern. Common cul-
tural factors – such as language, ethnicity or the same colonial history – are time-invariant and, as 
previously argued, contribute to the expansion of corruption and spatial spillovers. 
 
2.2- The model specification and the variables of control 
 
Let  be the vector of national corruption, itC jtC the vector of neighbor country’s corruption, itX  the 
vector of time-varying explanatory variables for a country i at period t and iZ  a certain number of 
time-invariant variables. The corruption equation under consideration is of the form: 
 1
2 1
*
n K
it jt i it i i i it
i k
C WC x zβ β δ μ
= =
= + + +∑ ∑ ε+    
 
jtWC  represents the regional corruption as calculated in previous subsection using W  as the spatial 
matrix weight13. It is important to point out that the coefficient 1β  captures the magnitude of spatial 
interactions among countries (Brueckner, 2003).  
Including other determinants of corruption is necessary in order to avoid the bias of omitted 
variables in the corruption equation. Such determinants may contribute to explain the interactions 
between countries and thereby the spatial spread of corruption. 
                                                 
12 Using Hausman-Taylor method could help one estimate the magnitude of time invariant-variables. However, in the 
specific case of corruption dependent variable, this method is not efficient. First, it could hardly overcome the problem 
of low within variation of corruption. Second, this method, as documented in the literature, is sensitive to the choice of 
the time-invariant endogenous variables.  
13 In this regard, it is important to note that our analysis is consistent with the empirical analysis of spatial interactions. 
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 a)  Level of development captured by the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita: a higher level of 
income is associated with a lower corruption (Scott, 1969; Paldam, 2002; Mbaku, 1999; Treis-
man, 1998; Tanzi, 2000)14  
b) Trade openness: greater (natural) openness is associated with lower corruption (in the context of 
perfect competition) (Ades and Di Tella, 1996, 1999, Nguesan and Laffont, 1999; Wei, 2000). 
As regard rents, the countries that export minerals and fuel are assumed to be more corrupt. 
c) Voice and accountability: used to capture the political factors. However the theory is ambiguous 
on the effect of political factors on corruption (LaPalombara, 1994; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; 
Huntington, 1996). 
d) Foreign aid/GNI: the relationship between foreign aid and corruption could be either positive or 
negative (Knack, 2003; Braütigam, 2004). 
e) Social factors: some social attributes can generate corruption or constrain it. They are captured 
by the ethnic and religious fractionalization and the proportion of protestants in 1980. 
f) Legal origin: legal origin affects corruption (La Porta et al., 1998). We consider two variables 
here, namely the British and the French legal origin.  
 
Section III- Results of the GMM regressions 
3.1- The neighborhood corruption effect 
 
Before presenting the main results, it is worth noting that apart from regional corruption, all the 
variables in any econometric specification are defined at the national single country level.  
The first column of Table 4 includes only the average of neighbors’ corruption. This pre-
liminary specification allows us to evaluate the simple correlation between national and regional 
levels of corruption. However, this coefficient may be biased because of omitted variables that may 
explain corruption. I therefore introduce other determinants of corruption in column 2 and thereaf-
ter. Different specifications are tested so as to examine the channels by which the contagion effect 
operates15.  
Our results strongly support the hypothesis that the perception of corruption in one country 
is affected by the corruption in its neighbor countries as measured by the regional average of cor-
ruption. Indeed, the higher the neighbors' corruption, the higher it is in one single country.  
                                                 
14 Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) have reached the opposite result wherein in their econometric specification Corruption 
causes lower GDP – strong effect while increased GDP increase corruption – but only slightly so in any rough correla-
tion between them high GDP goes together with low corruption level. 
15 For example, to conclude if the log of real GDP per capita is a transmission channel of the contagion effect, one will 
have to compare the coefficient of regional corruption in columns (1) and (2) and test if the two coefficients are signifi-
cantly different. 
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 Hence, positive spatial interactions of corrupt behaviors are confirmed. How do these inter-
actions occur? In the next paragraphs, I analyze the main channels through which the regional cor-
ruption affects the level of corruption in a given country. 
 
3.2- The other factors of corruption 
Theoretically, I expect a negative sign for this coefficient, which means that corruption decreases 
with the level of development. Globally, our results support this hypothesis (Treisman, 1998). In 
addition, this variable seems to be an important channel through which the regional corruption ex-
erts its effect on one country's corruption as we observe a great decrease of its coefficient once the 
income per capita variable is included. In column (2), the magnitude of the coefficient of regional 
corruption variable is reduced up to 62% of the one in column (1). 
In column 4 of Table 4, I include, in addition to the real GDP variable, three other variables: 
trade openness, mineral and fuels rents and voice and accountability. In the following lines, I com-
ment the specific effect of each variable.  
 Let us first consider trade openness. The trade variable is captured in the literature of the 
share of imports to GDP. Ades and Di Tella (1995, 1997), Treisman (1998) and Laffont and 
N'Guessan (1999) among others used the ratio of imports in GDP to capture the competition and 
rents in the national market of countries. 
However, using this indicator as a measure of competition is questionable. Lambsdorff (1999) ar-
gues that the ratio of imports to GDP is a distorted indicator of competition. According to him, this 
variable depends on country size. The larger countries may compensate their low import ratio by 
increasing competition in the national market. To overcome this distortion, I use the sum of imports 
and exports of goods and services normalized by the size of the economy (X+M)/GDP. As ex-
pected, we have a negative effect from this variable, that is, the more a country is opened to trade, 
the lower is its perceived rate of corruption. However, this effect seems to be sensitive to the intro-
duction of other variables such as GDP and regional corruption. The last two columns ((9) and (10)) 
confirm this assumption when I remove the GDP and the regional corruption variables. That is to 
say, trade openness is a potential channel through which the contagion effect of corruption is trans-
mitted. 
Countries that have high rates of raw material exports are expected to have high corruption 
levels. I used the export of natural resources (fuels, minerals) which may capture countries’ en-
dowment in natural resources (Treisman, 1999). Globally speaking, our results confirm this expec-
tation.  
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As far as the foreign aid variable is concerned, my regressions show that its effect on corrup-
tion is negative but weak.  
The expected theoretical relationship between corruption and political factors is ambiguous. 
Many factors characterize different political systems: the characteristics of the political regime, 
press freedom, etc. Knowing that the correlation between these factors is quite high, it is inappro-
priate to introduce them individually in the corruption index. In consequence, to capture the effect 
of all these factors as much as possible, we used the variable accountability and voice which is from 
the database of Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (KKM, 2003) as previously described. The results 
support the hypothesis that accountability and voice reduce national corruption. More importantly, 
my results suggest that accountability and voice contribute to explain the contagion effect of 
neighborhood corruption.  
 In columns (6) to (7) of Table 4, we introduce variables which capture social characteristics: 
ethnic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, British legal origin and French legal origin. 
They are prospective channels through which regional corruption exerts its effects. This assumption 
is only weakly supported by our data, however. While ethnic fragmentation increases corruption, 
religious fragmentation on the contrary reduces it. As far as ethnic fragmentation is concerned, 
some authors explain this result by the fact that ethnic division slows down the level of develop-
ment (Treisman, 1999; La Porta, 1997; Islam and Montenegro, 2002). Nevertheless, this result is 
not robust (when we drop the GDP variable from the regression, the effect becomes non-
significant). But, in his empirical study, Treisman has found that the sign of this variable changes 
from positive to negative after controlling for GDP per capita. The author explains this result by the 
fact that ethnic division slows down development and therefore indirectly increases the level of cor-
ruption. In theory, the relationship between ethnic fragmentation and corruption could be positive or 
negative (Isham and Montenegro, 2002). In the same sense, we argue that if there is at least a viable 
institution which allows individuals to denounce power abuse, the relation should be positive.  
 Table 4: GMM regressions; Dependent Variable: Corruption index (KKM, 2003)   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
           
Average of neighbors’ corruption 1.288*** 0.448** 0.409* 0.633*** 0.800 1.222*** 1.097*** 0.967   
 (12.1) (2.11) (1.92) (2.79) (0.86) (12.2) (9.77) (0.95)   
Log of real gdp per capita  -0.857*** -0.691*** -0.359* -0.753**   -0.378 -1.012*** -0.974*** 
  (-4.34) (-2.79) (-1.77) (-2.52)   (-0.80) (-3.78) (-5.24) 
Trade openness    -1.166** -0.430   -0.243 0.0847  
    (-2.32) (-1.18)   (-0.61) (0.16)  
Rent ( natural resources endowments)    0.00424 0.00690   0.000246 0.00849* 0.00877* 
    (-2.33) (-1.04)   (-1.81) (-1.24) (-1.33) 
Foreign aid/GNI     -0.0315   -0.0110 -0.0407* -0.0333** 
     (-1.15)   (-0.42) (-1.83) (-2.10) 
Voice and accountability   -0.448* -0.583** -0.374   -0.633* -0.301 -0.303 
   (-1.95) (-2.33) (-1.04)   (-1.81) (-1.24) (-1.33) 
Ethnic fractionalization       1.993*** 1.489 0.453 0.410 
       (2.84) (0.96) (0.76) (0.70) 
Religion fractionalization       -2.066*** -2.228 -0.600 -0.619 
       (-3.66) (-1.17) (-1.10) (-1.17) 
British legal origin      0.351  0.248 0.442 0.449 
      (0.74)  (0.28) (0.87) (1.00) 
French legal origin      0.872*  0.694 1.150** 1.126** 
      (1.80)  (0.74) (2.20) (2.22) 
Constant -1.499*** 9.104***  9.301*** 8.314 -1.770***     
 (-2.68) (3.63)  (3.66) (1.16) (-3.24)     
Observations 312 311 311 247 173 312 312 173 173 176 
R-squared 0.45 0.78 0.80 0.74 0.37 0.51 0.62 0.47 0.68 0.69 
Hansen J statistic 6.157 0.858 1.444 1.391 0.573 6.868 5.404 0.0607 0.0275 0.0644 
p-value of Hansen J statistic 0.0460 0.354 0.229 0.238 0.449 0.0323 0.0671 0.805 0.868 0.968 
For a given specification, bold figures refer to variables that are considered endogenous. Student statistics are in parenthesis. *** means that the variable is significant at 1% level; ** means the variable is 
significant at 5% level; * means the variable is significant at 10% level.
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 3.3- Using an alternative measure of regional corruption  
 
In addition to the previous measure of regional corruption, I used an alternative measure 
which is a weighted average of corruption. The existing literature debates what "neighbors" 
are exactly. Geographic distance may be a poor measure of economic distance for other coun-
tries not belonging to the neighborhood of a given country (Conley and Ligon, 2002). With 
globalization and the rapid development of new information and communication technolo-
gies, how more close is Côte d’Ivoire to Ghana or to China? I therefore assume, as do Moreno 
and Trehan (1997), that each country belongs to the neighborhood of every other country. 
Clearly, for a given country the regional corruption is calculated as the weighted average of 
the levels of corruption of all countries in the world: the weight is the inverse of the distance 
separating the capital of this country from the capital of the others. Put differently, the relative 
importance of each country in a particular neighborhood varies inversely with its distance 
from the country whose neighborhood it is. Thus, for a given country, its neighbors’ corrup-
tion is weighted more heavily than that of the remaining countries:  
1*
 with 1
j
ij
i
ij
C d
C i j≠ ijd
d
=
∑
∑  where is the distance between the capitals of two countries.  
Statistics are reported below.  
 Table 5: Alternative indicator of regional Corruption statistics 
 1996 1998 2000 2002
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Latin America 
OECD countries 
Other Developing Countries
7.70
7.34
1.79
6.93
4.15
4.02
2.61
4.10
4.50
4.41
2.73
4.42
4.19
4.16
2.79
4.21
Overall mean  6.07 3.78 4.08 3.90
 
The obtained figures represent the average corruption of the neighborhood of each country. 
Sub-Saharan countries show higher neighborhood corruption than OECD countries and the 
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 sample overall average. However, the difference between Latin America and other developing 
countries seems not to be highly significant.  
The alternative measure of regional corruption allows me to look at specific countries. 
Four African countries (Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Zambia) are among the ten highest 
corruption-neighborhood locations. The ten countries with the lowest neighborhood corrup-
tion are developed countries (table 6). 
 
Table 6: Neighborhood-corruption locations rankings 
Top ten locations Bottom ten locations 
Nig ria e Sweden 
Zimbabwe Austria 
Uzbekistan Finland 
Zambia Singapore 
Tanzania Netherlands 
Taiwan Denmark 
Paraguay USA 
Nicaragua Germany 
Ukraine Iceland 
Serbia Montenegro Ireland 
Source : based on author’s calculations 
 
In this paragraph, we will discuss our previous results in regard to those stemming from the 
alternative measure of spatial corruption. 
Looking at Table 7, the impact of spatial corruption on domestic corruption appears to be re-
inforced.  
This result somehow contributes to explain why corruption persists at a high level in 
some groups of countries or at low level in others. Let us consider the case of African coun-
tries which are assumed to have a higher level of corruption than the other developing coun-
tries. These African countries are also supposed to share similar institutional or economic 
characteristics. Because of the contiguity and the spillovers effects, when the level of corrup-
tion increases in a given country (for example Togo), the consequence is an increase in cor-
ruption in a nearby country (for example Benin). As far as the two countries exhibit persistent 
increases in corruption, they will be locked into a vicious circle where corruption feeds cor-
ruption. In a symmetric way, any reduction in corruption in a single country, for example 
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South Africa, would be associated with reduced corruption in neighboring countries such as 
Botswana or Zimbabwe. 
What would happen if developed countries interact with developing ones? What will 
happen if a country like Senegal – where corruption is perceived to be high – interacts with 
France, a supposed low-corruption country? According to our econometric results, if the level 
of corruption decreases in France, the corruption level in Senegal will also decrease as a con-
sequence. However, it is important to note that the direction of causality does not seem obvi-
ous. Will the level of corruption in France increase if the corruption level in Senegal in-
creases? The answer may be yes. But the final level of corruption resulting from the interac-
tions of these two countries may probably depend on some factors like the negotiation power 
or the influence of France. 
The remaining results don’t fundamentally change. That is to say, the levels of devel-
opment, trade and political factors are the main channels of impact. 
 Table 7: GMM regressions; Dependent Variable: Corruption index (KKM, 2003) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (12) (13) 
 GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
           
Weighted average of neighbors’ corrup-
tion 
3.823*** 4.746*** 4.785*** 3.416*** 3.727*** 3.556** 3.980* 3.836*** 3.738*** 2.154*** 
 (44.3) (5.36) (5.05) (5.80) (4.37) (2.59) (1.97) (39.0) (32.8) (3.27) 
Log of real gdp per capita  0.301 0.301 -0.175 -0.0683 -0.328 -0.195   -0.317 
  (1.04) (0.99) (-1.05) (-0.27) (-1.10) (-0.62)   (-1.64) 
Trade openness    0.275 0.234 0.140 0.115   -0.156 
    (1.09) (1.36) (0.43) (0.29)   (-0.99) 
Rent (Natural resources endowments)    0.00687 0.00611 0.00202 0.000780   0.00119 
    (1.43) (1.18) (0.26) (0.088)   (0.29) 
Foreign aid/GNI      -0.0776** -0.0782   -0.0476*** 
      (-2.10) (-1.66)   (-3.05) 
Voice and accountability   0.0219 0.170 0.169 0.241 0.273   -0.0700 
   (0.088) (0.67) (0.69) (0.78) (0.68)   (-0.33) 
Ethnic Fractionalization         0.282 1.280*** 
         (1.29) (3.18) 
Religion Fractionalization         -0.243 -0.639** 
         (-1.51) (-2.32) 
British legal origin        -0.0987  -0.0820 
        (-0.73)  (-0.22) 
French legal origin        -0.0844  0.0248 
        (-0.64)  (0.052) 
Constant -14.12*** -20.99***  -12.03*** -14.23** -10.65 -13.68 -14.10***   
 (-33.7) (-3.19)  (-2.70) (-2.17) (-1.11) (-1.02) (-32.6)   
Observations 312 311 311 247 247 173 173 312 312 173 
R-squared -1.94 -3.57 -3.65 -1.49 -1.97 -1.70 -2.40 -1.96 -1.81 0.01 
Hansen J statistic 2.503 0.533 0.512 2.530 2.440 0.131 0.198 3.394 3.313 0.162 
p-value of J  0.286 0.465 0.474 0.112 0.118 0.717 0.656 0.183 0.191 0.687 
For a given specification, bold figures refer to variables. Student statistics are in parenthesis. *** means that the variable is significant at 1% level; ** means the variables is significant at 5% level; * means 
the variable is significant at 10% level. 
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 Section IV- Checking the robustness of our results 
 
The GMM used in the previous section prevents me to take into account the dynamic persis-
tence of corruption because I could not introduce the lagged values of the dependent variable 
(because convergence conditions could not be met). One may question whether my analysis is 
sufficient to confirm definitely the spatial contagion effect. In order to clear up any ambiguity, 
I therefore use the feasible generalized three-stage least square results (3SLS) where data are 
stacked by periods. Unlike the two-stage least square (2SLS), the 3SLS method takes into 
account the correlation between the different equations of the system under consideration. By 
allowing for a correlation between error terms, I argue that the persistence idea in the percep-
tion of corruption over time is taken into account. With respect to spatial interactions, a shock 
in the error term in any country will be transmitted to all other countries through the multi-
plier effect (Anselin, 2002). 
Tables 8 and 9 present 3SLS results for both the simple regional corruption and the 
weighted regional corruption. Most of our previous results are confirmed after I corrected for 
the dynamic correlations in the error terms. Specifically, regional corruption affects national 
corruption. Clearly, the reduction in the level of corruption in a country's neighbors is associ-
ated with a lower level of corruption in this country. Besides this result, the level of develop-
ment as measured by per capita income is inversely related to the spread of corruption. 
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Table 8: Three stages least squares regressions; Dependent Variable: Corruption index (KKM, 2003) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 
Average of neighbors’ corruption  0.451*** 0.609*** 1.188*** 0.416*** 0.562*** 0.546*** 0.406*** 
  (4.37) (21.85) (12.20) (4.15) (12.57) (11.64) (3.99) 
Log of real gdp per capita  0.202  -0.823*** 0.184   0.181 
  (1.47)  (6.61) (1.32)   (1.25) 
Trade openness  -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.005** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
  (5.30) (6.43) (2.45) (3.57) (4.12) (4.19) (3.58) 
Rent ( Natural resources endowments)  0.014** 0.013** 0.013** 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
  (2.07) (2.25) (2.01) (1.40) (1.59) (1.61) (1.41) 
Foreign Aid/GNP  0.052 0.034  0.039 0.024 0.038 0.047 
  (1.25) (0.95)  (0.93) (0.66) (0.97) (1.04) 
Voice and accountability  -0.777*** -0.836*** -1.013*** -0.774*** -0.840*** -0.825*** -0.761*** 
  (5.04) (5.84) (5.37) (4.56) (5.24) (5.09) (4.41) 
Ethnic Fractionalization     2.186*** 1.804*** 1.929*** 2.283*** 
     (2.76) (2.62) (2.74) (2.82) 
Religion     -0.676 -0.485 -0.153 -0.444 
     (0.89) (0.76) (0.21) (0.51) 
British legal origin     -0.952** -0.928** -0.813* -0.879* 
     (2.07) (2.32) (1.95) (1.82) 
French legal origin     -0.344 -0.230 -0.161 -0.295 
     (0.97) (0.81) (0.55) (0.79) 
Dummy Africa       -0.196 -0.142 
       (  0.23) 0.17)(  
Constant  2.907*** 3.895*** 7.551*** 2.673*** 3.585*** 3.439*** 2.578*** 
  (4.31) (15.08) (11.42) (4.05) (10.33) (9.48) (3.87) 
Number of observations  41 41 57 41 41 41 41 
R squared (min, max)  0.21 0.09 0.39 0.32 0.20 0.21 0.32 
For a given specification, bold figures refer to variables. Student statistics are in parenthesis. *** means that the variable is significant at 1% level; ** means the variables is significant at 5% level; * 
means the variable is significant at 10% level. 
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Table 9: Determinants of corruption: the contagion effects; Dependent Variable: Corruption index (KKM, 2003) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 3SLS 
Weighted average of neighbors’ corruption 1.049*** 0.04785* 0.266*** 0.285*** 0.189*** 0.209*** 0.216*** 0.188*** 
 (46.49) (1.63) (3.83) (3.80) (2.85) (2.88) (2.93) (2.80) 
Log of real gdp per capita  -1.216*** -0.873***  -0.861***   -0.904*** 
  (16.00) (4.45)  (4.29)   (4.37) 
Trade openness   -0.004** -0.009*** -0.004** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.005** 
   (2.32) (5.12) (2.00) (4.07) (3.88) (2.05) 
Rent ( Natural resources endowments)   0.011** 0.008 0.012** 0.007 0.007 0.012** 
   (2.51) (1.65) (2.38) (1.33) (1.35) (2.42) 
Foreign Aid/GNP   -0.076** 0.026 -0.069** 0.024 0.028 -0.065* 
   (2.31) (1.01) (2.02) (0.86) (0.86) (1.75) 
Voice and accountability   -0.419*** -0.595*** -0.499*** -0.655*** -0.652*** -0.485*** 
   (3.69) (4.94) (3.88) (4.82) (4.73) (3.71) 
Ethnic Fractionalization     0.409 1.336** 1.340** 0.479 
     (0.71) (2.19) (2.14) (0.82) 
Religion     -0.365 -0.652 -0.623 -0.106 
     (0.73) (1.14) (0.95) (0.19) 
British legal origin     -0.549* -0.813** -0.800** -0.464 
     (1.77) (2.32) (2.18) (1.42) 
French legal origin     -0.260 -0.542** -0.534* -0.202 
     (1.09) (2.07) (1.96) (0.81) 
Dummy Africa       -0.119 -0.296 
       (0.23) (0.62) 
Constant -1.646*** 13.823*** 10.603*** 3.942*** 11.203*** 4.531*** 4.469*** 11.402*** 
 (10.16) (20.32) (6.67) (6.62) (6.85) (6.72) (6.44) (6.85) 
Number of observations 101 99 41 41 41 41 41 41 
R squared (min, max) 0.47; 0.88 0.77; 0.80 0.81; 0.85 0.69; 0.83 0.81; 0.86 0.74; 0.80 0.74; 0.81 0.84; 0.87 
For a given specification, bold figures refer to variables. Student statistics are in parenthesis. *** means that the variable is significant at 1% level; ** means the variables is significant at 5% level; * 
means the variable is significant at 10% level. 
 Conclusion 
 
“Governance matters”, this phrase summarizes the new direction given to economic policies in de-
veloping countries since 1980. Combating corruption has become a priority because developing 
countries are more corrupted than rich ones. In this line, researchers are interested in investigating 
the factors of corruption in theoretical as well as in empirical studies so as to help policy makers. At 
the same time, in most of the studies the persistence of corruption has hardly been studied. In the 
present study, contrary to much of previous empirical analyses, I allow for the correlation between 
countries. I also assume that this persistence in developing countries could be explained by the con-
tagion effect captured by the neighborhood corruption.  
My results demonstrate a cross-country spillover mechanism where a lower regional corrup-
tion, as measured by the average of the level of corruption in one country's neighbors, is associated 
with a lower level of national corruption. Among the operating channels, the level of development 
seems to be the most important one. While foreign aid and trade exhibit similar results, voice and 
accountability are other possible interaction mechanisms. These results are robust to the temporal 
error correlation in corruption perception in each country. As such, my results may help to get new 
insights into the determinants of corruption and its spatial effect.  
The results of this paper may point to certain policy recommendations. I argue that since na-
tional corruption is affected by neighborhood corruption, countries localized in either close or dis-
tant geographical areas should coordinate their individual anti-corruption policies. In this regard, 
our study highlights and supports the importance of existing and new regional or international 
agreements on combating corruption16. To fight the plague, these actions should be reinforced and 
made effective through the definition and the application of punishment rules, the possibility to 
launch international prosecutions against people if they try to evade arrest for corruption at home, 
etc.  
Further, based on the fact that most existing conventions and treaties against corruption took 
root in developed countries and even though they expand positively their activities in developing 
ones, new bilateral and global policies that are initiated by and among the developing countries 
should be encouraged so as to involve them more actively in the combat. If countries do not succeed 
in collaborating, corruption in whole regions may settle on high equilibria levels or even expand.
                                                 
16 Among others, we can cite the OECD Anti-bribery Convention (1996), the Inter-American Convention Against Cor-
ruption (1997), the European Action on Corruption in the Private Sector (1998); the African Parliamentarians’ Network 
Against Corruption (1999), the United Nations Convention against Corruption (2003), the African Union Convention 
on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003).  
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 Appendix A1 : Description and sources of the variables used 
Variables Definitions Source 
Corruption 
Perception of corruption, defined as the exercise of public
power for private gains. It is a composite measure resulting
from different sources which cover many aspects of corrup-
tion: additional payment to get things done, business corrup-
tion, political corruption.  
Voice and accountability 
Measures various aspects of the political process, civil liber-
ties 
and political rights. These indicators measure the extent to 
which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selec-
tion of governments. We also include in this category indica-
tors measuring the independence of the media, which serves 
an important role in holding monitoring those in authority and 
holding them accountable for their actions 
Kaufman, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi 
(2003) 
Real GDP per capita 
It is calculated as the sum of gross value added by all resident
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus
any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is
calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural
resources. Data are in constant 1995 U.S. dollars. Dollar
figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies
using 1995 official exchange rates. 
Trade openness 
Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
measured as a share of gross domestic product. 
 
Rent ( Natural resources endowments) 
Exports of fuel and minerals as proportion of % of total mer-
chandise exports. Merchandise exports show the f.o.b. value 
of goods provided to the rest of the world valued in U.S. 
dollars. 
Foreign Aid/GNP 
Aid includes both official development assistance (ODA) and
official aid. Ratios are computed using values in U.S. dollars 
converted at official exchange rates. 
 
World Develop-
ment Indicators 
(WDI) 2004 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
 
Probability that two randomly selected individuals will be-
long to different ethnic groups : 
2
1
th
i
1 ;M=number of ethnic groups, N= total population, 
n number of people who belong to i  ethnic group
M
i
i
n
FRAC
N=
= −
=
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  
Religion Religious fractionalization : Probability that two randomly selected individuals will belong to different ethnic groups : 
Alesina et al; 
(2003) 
British legal origin Equal to 1 if a country has a British legal system, zero else 
French legal origin Equal to 1 if a country has a French legal system, zero else 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
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 Appendix A2 : List of countries 
Code Country Code Country  Country 
AGO Angola HKG Hong Kong PER Peru 
ALB Albania HND Honduras POL Poland 
ARE United Arab Emirates HRV Croatia PRK Korea, North 
ARG Argentina HTI Haiti PRT Portugal 
ARM Armenia HUN Hungary PRY Paraguay 
AUT Austria IND India QAT Qatar 
AZE Azerbaijan IRN Iran ROM Romania 
BFA Burkina Faso IRQ Iraq RUS Russia 
BGD Bangladesh ISR Israel SAU Saudi Arabia 
BGR Bulgaria ITA Italy SDN Sudan 
BLR Belarus JOR Jordan SEN Senegal 
BOL Bolivia KAZ Kazakhstan SGP Singapore 
BRA Brazil KEN Kenya SLE Sierra Leone 
BRN Brunei KGZ Kyrgyz Republic SLV El Salvador 
CAN Canada KHM Cambodia SOM Somalia 
CHL Chile KOR Korea, South SUR Suriname 
CHN China KWT Kuwait SVK Slovak Republic 
CIV Ivory Coast LAO Laos SVN Slovenia 
CMR Cameroon LBN Lebanon SWE Sweden 
COG Congo LBR Liberia SYR Syria 
COL Colombia LBY Libya TGO Togo 
CRI Costa Rica LTU Lithuania THA Thailand 
CZE Czech Republic LVA Latvia TJK Tajikistan 
DEU Germany MAR Morocco TKM Turkmenistan 
DNK Denmark MDA Moldova TUN Tunisia 
DOM Dominican Republic MEX Mexico TUR Turkey 
DZA Algeria MKD Macedonia TZA Tanzania 
ECU Ecuador MLI Mali UGA Uganda 
EGY Egypt MMR Myanmar UKR Ukraine 
ESP Spain MNG Mongolia URY Uruguay 
EST Estonia MOZ Mozambique USA United States 
FIN Finland MWI Malawi UZB Uzbekistan 
FRA France MYS Malaysia VEN Venezuela 
GAB Gabon NER Niger VNM Vietnam 
GEO Georgia NGA Nigeria YUG Yugoslavia 
GHA Ghana NIC Nicaragua ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) 
GIN Guinea NLD Netherlands ZMB Zambie 
GMB Gambia NOR Norway ZWE Zimbabwe 
GNB Guinea-Bissau NPL Nepal   
GRC Greece OMN Oman   
GTM Guatemala PAK Pakistan   
GUY Guyana PAN Panama   
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Appendix A3: Statistics summary 
     
Variables Mean Standard  
Deviation. 
Minimum Maximum 
Log of gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita 
7.823 1.609 4.612 10.938 
Log of trade 4.248 0.5166 2.820 5.831 
Fuel and mineral exports  11.345 19.544 0.000012 99.634 
Foreign aid 5.140 8.376 -0.364 57.391 
Voice and accountability 0.165 0.906 -2.321 1.719 
British legal origin 0.264 0.441 0 1 
French legal origin 0.400 0.490 0 1 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.421 0.251 0.012 0.930 
Religious fractionalization 0.443 0.227 0.003 0.860 
Log of population 15.610 1.969 9.868 20.718 
Log of infant mortality 3.545 0.899 1.979 5.0888 
Latitude to equator .3411 0.198 .0111 0.722 
 
 
 
 
